This grant supported a project concerned with the monitoring of dangerous research, part of the Foundation's bioterrorism program. It supplied partial funding for a workshop and related activities to raise awareness in the international bioscience community about issues of dual-use research in the life sciences. The 3-day workshop organized by the Royal Society was held in early September 2006 with approximately 75 participants from around the globe. The workshop was co-hosted with the International Council for Science and the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues. It supplied an opportunity for participants to share knowledge and experience with national and international initiatives, encourage new collaborations, and increase commitments for training and education on dual-use issues. The final report of the international workshop, transcripts of workshop presentations, and a key points statement on the scientific and technological developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention can all be found online at the Royal Society website, www.royalsoc.ac.uk. Project Director: Nick Green, Science Policy Manager (International Security).

This grant supports a workshop and follow-up activities to develop assistance for citizens on personal preparedness measures for pandemic influenza as well as other biological threats. Workshop participants examined and evaluated various personal preparedness measures (masks, air filtering, etc.), with the aim of formulating guidance to citizens and employers as to what can be done to empower individuals to avoid infecting themselves or others. In addition to the workshop, the plan included publications, information posted on websites, additional dissemination through partner organizations, and briefings with government officials. (For additional information, see the policy paper brief published following the workshop in the November 10, 2006 issue of Science: "Next Flu Pandemic: What to Do Until the Vaccine Arrives.") Project Director: Stephen S. Morse, Director, Center for Public Health Preparedness, Mailman School of Public Health.

A prior grant to the National Academy concerning issues of dangerous research resulted in the 2003 National Research Council Report: "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma." This report called for building upon existing regulations and creating a voluntary system of self-policing. Its seven specific recommendations led to the establishment in 2004 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. A 2004 Foundation grant enabled the National Academy, in collaboration with three international scientific partners, to organize and host the International Forum on Biosecurity held in Italy in March 2005, aimed at engaging and educating the international scientific community on the dual-use risks of biotechnology research. At the Forum, the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues (IAP) presented its statement on biosecurity, subsequently endorsed by more than two thirds of the national academies who are members of the IAP and released as an official IAP document in late 2006. The current grant supports the International Biosecurity Project (IBP), whose goal is to work with international partners, other academies and international organizations, as well as a wide range of inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, in order to develop and promote more effective international strategies to reduce the risk that advances in research in the life sciences could be misused. A second International Forum on Biosecurity will be held in the fall of 2007 to bring together scientists and policy makers to discuss how best to achieve the project's goals. Project Director: Jo L. Husbands, Senior Project Director, Office of International Affairs.

A 2005 grant to the University of Exeter supported a project to raise awareness in the worldwide life sciences community of possible destructive applications of new knowledge in the life sciences. A series of seminars were held in the US, South Africa, the Netherlands, and Finland that explored opinions of over 800 life scientists about such questions as whether there are any lines of research that should not be followed and any research better left unpublished or restricted in dissemination. Consistent with outcomes of earlier similar inquiries, results reinforced the view that there is a great need for education and outreach to raise awareness of the possible destructive applications of the life sciences. Moreover, it became clear that there are ways to engage practicing scientists with well-designed educational modules and training materials, written and online, directed at such awareness-raising. The current grant enables an expansion of this work to seven countries with established or emerging biotechnology research, most likely China, Egypt, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, and the Ukraine. With local collaborators, researchers will conduct seminars, brief policy makers, adapt and institutionalize the training materials, and train local trainers. Papers will be published, a workshop will be held in D.C., and input provided to various organizations such as the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. Project Director: Professor Brian Rappert, Department of Sociology, School of Historical, Political and Sociological Studies.

An earlier Foundation grant to the University of Minnesota's Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) partially funded a meeting, attended by over 300 business leaders from 200 companies, on "Business Planning for Pandemic Influenza." Participants indicated that they would welcome additional resources to help them and their companies plan and better prepare for pandemic influenza. They had in mind more meetings/networking opportunities, online forums/webinars, an electronic newsletter with current news and information, and Internet-based information. The current grant supplies partial start-up funds to establish a comprehensive and authoritative business preparedness information service consisting of a weekly e-mail newsletter (CIDRAP Business Briefing) and a continuously updated website library to help businesses prepare for pandemic influenza and other disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or man-made. CIDRAP will also establish a forum of leading businesses from 12 different business sectors to convene meetings, arrange conference calls, and develop action-oriented white papers. The weekly e-mail newsletter will contain planning articles, case studies, networking information on upcoming events, summaries of recent key meetings and policy announcements, and analysis of scientific, economic and business planning information. The website will provide access to an up-to-date web-based document repository stocked with comprehensive lists of state plans, company plans, government guidance, and other credible and useful resources. The program will be supported by company subscriptions and CIDRAP expects it to be self-sustaining within a year. Project Director: Professor Michael T. Osterholm, School of Public Health; Director, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy.

During the 2005 SARS outbreak in Toronto, fear of lost wages turned out to be the leading inhibitor to rigorous compliance with voluntary quarantine orders. A common sick leave policies template needs to be developed that would identify, for various levels of quarantine and isolation, sick leave policy options, cost considerations for each option, legal and human resource policy barriers, and communication strategies. On another matter, it would be very useful to have a template that outlines the policy and cost options of extending "Good Samaritan" liability coverage to business and non-profit entities. Most states provide a level of liability protection to individuals who voluntarily assist injured persons in an emergency situation, but these state laws do not extend to businesses and non-profit entities. Such a template would ease liability concerns and help remove an obstacle for these entities to enter into agreements with public health agencies as part of preparedness activities. This grant supports work to develop policy and legislative templates in the above two areas: common sick leave policies and "Good Samaritan" liability protections for business and non-profit entities. The UNC team also plans to create new networks and alliances among business and public health leaders to assist in the development and implementation of these templates. Pilot implementation projects are planned for North Carolina and Georgia. Identifying key legal issues and policy alternatives and supplying concise roadmaps of the issues, options, and policy choices will help companies revise their sick leave policies and state legislatures enact "Good Samaritan" liability protections for business and non-profits and thereby help improve business and public health preparedness. Project Director: Edward L. Baker, Director, North Carolina Institute for Public Health.

Foundation grants, first made before 9/11, and subsequently renewed in 2004 have helped the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center's Center for Biosecurity become an international leader in biodefense. The Center wrote the definitive papers on the medical and public health management of six principal threat agents: anthrax, smallpox, plague, tularemia, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fever viruses. Using smallpox as an example, it demonstrated that an attack on the U.S. with biological weapons would cause mass casualties in light of the country's lack of preparation. This paved the way for many changes, including the procurement of 300 million doses of smallpox vaccine. During the past two years, the Center undertook a wide range of analytic efforts to evaluate the biodefense strategy and major biodefense initiatives of the federal government, focusing on strategies for containment of contagious disease epidemics, healthcare system preparedness, and pandemic flu preparedness. It published analyses of the budgets and allocations for biodefense at the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Agriculture. On the international front, in 2005 the Center designed and developed "Atlantic Storm," a bioterrorism tabletop exercise that highlighted urgent issues and strategic political problems that would demand the attention of world leaders in the event of a bioterrorism crisis and focused national and international attention on problems of preparing for bioattacks. The Center convened a group of leading experts in air filtration, building ventilation, public health, building design and operation, biosecurity, economics, and medicine, resulting in the 2006 publication, Improving Performance of HVAC Systems to Reduce Exposure to Aerosolized Infectious Agents in Buildings: Recommendations to Reduce Risks Posed by Biological Attacks. Center personnel continue to conduct numerous educational and outreach programs, give expert testimony to Congress, brief many senior government officials, and edit Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, the only peer-reviewed journal devoted to biodefense.

The current grant represents renewal support for the next two years for Center activities to address three strategic objectives: (1) Persuade key U.S. and international leaders and the American public that the bioterrorism threat is one of the most serious threats to national security and convey the major actions necessary to counter it; (2) Increase national resilience to bioterrorist attacks by assessing top biothreats and vulnerabilities, analyzing programs intended to address them, and identifying best practices and needed new initiatives; and
(3) Increase civilian resiliency to bioterrorist attacks by analyzing public views, improving communication flows to the public, and providing guidance on what civilians can do to take care of themselves at home. Project Director: Tara O'Toole, MD, CEO and Director, Center for Biosecurity.

The following grants were made from appropriations approved by the Board of Trustees in 2004 and 2006 for support of short-term projects and the planning stages of promising larger projects to reduce the threat of bioterrorism.

To conduct a roundtable on corporate preparedness for pandemic flu. Project Director: David A. Wilkinson, Principal.

To provide partial support for a workshop, "Workplace preparedness and response to disaster and terrorism." Project Director: Robert J. Ursano, Chairman, Department of Psychiatry, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

For partial support of "Business Planning for Pandemic Influenza: A National Summit." Project Director: Professor Michael T. Osterholm, School of Public Health, and Director, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy.

To improve pandemic preparedness by supporting preparation and dissemination of a paper that presents historical data about the 1918 influenza pandemic. Project Director: Professor Douglas J. Meffert, Tulane/Xavier Center for Bioenvironmental Research.

To support planning activities for the "International Workshop on Science and Technology Developments Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention." Project Director: Nick Green, Science Policy Manager (International Security).

To provide partial support for a study of enhanced air filtration in buildings. Project Director: H. E. Barney Burroughs, President and CEO.

To support a feasibility study to develop a network of globalized bioscientists. Project Director: Alan Pearson, Director of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Control Program.

Emory University
Atlanta, GA 30322

To develop recommendations that encourage and facilitate business and government partnerships for improving preparedness for public health emergencies related to infectious diseases. Project Director: James W. Buehler, Research Professor, Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health.

To raise awareness of issues of potentially dangerous research in the synthetic biology community. Project Director: Jay D. Keasling, Professor of Chemical Engineering and Bioengineering, and Director of the Berkeley Center for Synthetic Biology.